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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter discusses how justice applies to public health. It begins by outlining three
different metrics employed in discussions of justice: resources, capabilities, and welfare.
It then discusses different accounts of justice in distribution, reviewing utilitarianism,
egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism, as well as desert-based theories,
and applies these distributive approaches to public health examples. Next, it examines
the interplay between distributive justice and individual rights, such as religious rights,
property rights, and rights against discrimination, by discussing examples such as
mandatory treatment and screening. The chapter also examines the nexus between public
health and debates concerning whose interests matter to justice (the “scope of justice”),
including global justice, intergenerational justice, and environmental justice, as well as
debates concerning whether justice applies to individual choices or only to institutional
structures (the “site of justice”). The chapter closes with a discussion of strategies, in
cluding deliberative and aggregative democracy, for adjudicating disagreements about
justice.
Keywords: justice, public health ethics, distribution, egalitarianism, utilitarianism, welfare, resources, democracy,
capabilities, rights

(p. 33)

Introduction

PUBLIC health is concerned with the health of entire populations and societies. Questions
about how societies ought to be shaped by choices, in public health and elsewhere, are
the subject matter of justice. To see how justice intersects with public health, imagine an
international public health researcher—we’ll call her Julie—examining a World Health Or
ganization chart of life expectancy in South America (see Figure 4.1).
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(p. 34)

Figure 4.1 Life Expectancy at Birth: South

America
Source: Reprinted from WHO, 2016. Used with per
mission of the World Health Organization.

As Julie examines the chart, she sees that life expectancy is over eighty years in Chile, but
under seventy years in Bolivia and Guyana. These facts present two questions at the heart
of justice: (1) What are the criteria for a good society? (2) What are acceptable differ
ences in what people enjoy within and between societies?
At lunch, Julie tells her colleagues about the chart, while they tell her about their public
health projects, which include water quality, vaccinations, urban planning, and taxation
and economic policy. Their discussion presents a third question at the interface of justice
and public health: Which public health interventions will make for a better society? This
question has both an empirical component concerning what outcomes public health inter
ventions will produce, and a normative component concerning which outcomes are worth
seeking. Julie and her colleagues also discuss organizational priorities. Some advocate
funding interventions that are already recognized as cost-effective. Others argue for fund
ing new interventions that promise to narrow gaps in life expectancy. Still others worry
that some of the interventions, such as changes in urban design or taxes on unhealthy
foods, would unfairly burden some individuals or groups. Although these discussions may
never explicitly use the word justice, they involve the sorts of questions examined in the
remainder of this chapter.

What Should We Measure?: Metrics of Justice
Metrics are methodologies for quantifying and evaluating the contribution of various in
terventions, including public health interventions, to the achievement of a just society.
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The three most prominent metrics are those that focus on resources, capabilities, and
welfare (Daniels, 1990).

Resources
Resourcist metrics judge the justice of a society by looking at how it distributes re
sources. John Rawls (1999) proposes a primary goods approach, which has become a
prominent resourcist metric. Rawls defines primary goods as including income and
wealth, as well as less tangible goods such as rights and social bases of self-respect.
Resourcist metrics make data collection easy and avoid judgments about what a
good life is. Some people worry, however, that resourcist metrics are unfair to individuals
with disabilities or illnesses who require more resources than others in order to pursue
their goals or participate in society (Sen, 1985). Familiar resource metrics for public
health audiences include gross domestic product (GDP) and per-capita GDP, which mea
sure a society’s total and average economic resources, respectively.
(p. 35)

Capabilities
Capability metrics, pioneered by Amartya Sen (1985) and Martha Nussbaum (2003), look
at the distribution of capabilities, which are freedoms to engage in various activities.
Nussbaum lists ten capabilities with universal importance—life; bodily health; bodily in
tegrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; interac
tion with other species; play; and control over one’s environment—while Sen (2004) sug
gests that the list of capabilities can differ between societies and be developed through
public discussion.
Capability metrics emphasize active dimensions of human life, such as choice and agency,
rather than focusing on passive enjoyment or resource possession. However, critics worry
that such metrics underrate the importance of actual outcomes (Arneson, 2010), and that
measuring and comparing capabilities may be difficult and intrusive (Freeman, 2006). In
light of the former concern, Ruth Faden and Madison Powers (2006) have developed a
metric that draws on the capability approach but focuses on actual functionings—the ac
tivities individuals engage in—rather than capabilities, and have applied this metric to
public health. The Human Development Index, which combines life expectancy, literacy,
and income measures, also builds on ideas from the capability approach and is widely
used in public health (Fukuda-Parr, 2003).

Welfare
Welfarist accounts assess justice by examining the distribution of welfare. Some welfarist
accounts define welfare as a subjective mental state of pleasure, others define it as pref
erence satisfaction, and still others define it using a list of objectively valuable experi
ences (Parfit, 1984, Appendix I). All of these approaches face problems, which include
concerns about repugnant, expensive, and self-sacrificing preferences, as well as con
cerns that subjective mental states matter far less than the arrangement of external reali
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ty (Faden and Powers, 2006; Nozick, 1974). Prominent welfarists include Jeremy Bentham
(1843) and Peter Singer (1979), as well as many economists. Welfarist public health met
rics include quality-adjusted and disability-adjusted life years (QALYs and DALYs), which
are typically generated via surveys of individuals’ subjective experiences of different
health setbacks (Gold, Stevenson, and Fryback, 2002).
Some public health interventions are similarly attractive regardless of what metric is
used. As an example, clean water is likely to improve the resources, capabilities, and wel
fare (p. 36) of its recipients. For other interventions, however, the choice of metrics mat
ters greatly—alcohol taxes appear less attractive under some welfare-based metrics,
which assign weight to drinkers’ subjective pleasure, than capability or resource metrics,
which assign such pleasure little or no weight.

Who Should Get What? Principles of Distribu
tive Justice
Along with what to measure, we must also consider how to distribute whatever is mea
sured. Noncorrelative principles do not try to correlate how much each individual re
ceives with other facts about that individual, whereas correlative principles do.

Noncorrelative Principles
Maximization
This principle maximizes what is available, irrespective of distribution. In Julie’s example,
maximization would favor improving life expectancy by five years in Chile, which has a
high life expectancy, over improving it by four years for an equally sized group of individ
uals in Bolivia, which has a much lower life expectancy. Maximization is often described
as utilitarianism, though that term is more frequently used to refer specifically to welfare
maximization, as opposed to capability or resource maximization. A frequently discussed
basis for public health decisions is maximizing the number of QALYs saved or DALYs
avoided (Schwappach, 2002).
Maximization becomes more complicated when public health interventions that change
the size of the population, such as family planning, are at issue. Applying a maximization
approach to interventions that change population size presents a choice between total
and average maximization. Maximizing the average favors a smaller population with a
lower sum of whatever is valuable, but in which the average individual is better off,
whereas maximizing the total favors the opposite. Each view faces problems: the average
view is criticized for its unwillingness to add individuals who enjoy a substantial amount
of whatever is valuable to a very well-off population when adding these people would fail
to maximize the average, while the total view is criticized for favoring policies that pro
duce a vast population in which each individual enjoys little of what is valuable (Parfit,
1984). In an effort to address these concerns, some have attempted to combine elements
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of both total and average maximization, though no solution appears completely satisfacto
ry (Arrhenius, Ryberg, and Tännsjö 2010).

Prioritarianism: Priority to the Worst Off
Prioritarian approaches assign special importance to helping those at the bottom of a dis
tribution. Strict prioritarian views, such as Rawls’s “difference principle” (1999, 67–73),
(p. 37) give absolute priority to the worst-off group, while flexible prioritarian views em
ploy a sliding scale of priority, on which priority increases as individuals become worse
off (Parfit, 1997, 213). Prioritarian distributive principles have support among health care
planners (Ottersen et al., 2008). Incorporating distributional weights into cost-effective
ness analysis, by assigning more importance to QALY increases that go to individuals who
are worse off, represents one way of quantifying prioritarian ideas in public health (Ot
tersen, Mæstad, and Norheim, 2014).
In the WHO example, a flexible prioritarian view might favor a five-year improvement in
Guyanese life expectancy over a six-year improvement in Brazil, but not over a ten-year
improvement in Brazil. In contrast, a strict prioritarian view will always favor even a mi
nuscule improvement for the worst-off over an enormous one for the better-off. This has
prompted criticism of the strict prioritarian view (Arrow, 1973).

Egalitarianism
Egalitarianism aims to reduce inequalities in distribution. In Julie’s example, egalitarian
ism would agree with prioritarianism that extra weight should be given to improving life
expectancy in countries with lower life expectancies. Strict egalitarianism aims to achieve
complete equality, while looser approaches propose what Elizabeth Anderson (2008) calls
“range-constraining rules” that limit the extent of inequality. Many familiar measures of
inequality, such as the Gini coefficient (which quantifies the extent to which people’s in
comes differ), are employed in public health (Wagstaff, Paci, and van Doorslaer, 1991).
Although egalitarian and prioritarian approaches frequently make the same recommenda
tions, prioritarians focus on the absolute position of the worst off, while egalitarians focus
on the gap between the worst off and the better off. Therefore, egalitarians, unlike priori
tarians, will sometimes advocate “leveling down”; that is, they will sometimes object to an
improvement that helps the worst off but increases inequality. Leveling down has been
criticized by prioritarians (Parfit, 1997) but defended by some egalitarians (Eyal, 2013).

Sufficientarianism
Sufficientarianism ensures that no one falls below a specified threshold (Shields, 2012).
Some define thresholds in absolute terms, while others argue that thresholds of sufficien
cy must vary with social context (Faden and Powers, 2006). The use of poverty thresholds,
such as the $1 per day threshold employed in the Millennium Development Goals
(Deaton, 2003), represents the most prominent effort to operationalize a sufficientarian
view in a domain relevant to public health. Some human rights documents also define the
right to health as a right to adequate or sufficient health (Persad, 2014, 603–604).
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As an example, applying a life expectancy threshold of seventy-two years of age to the
WHO chart would support public health interventions that increase life expectancy in Bo
livia and Guyana, which have life expectancies under seventy-two, but would be neutral
between interventions in Paraguay and in Chile, even though Paraguayans live less long
on average than Chileans. Sufficientarianism, like prioritarianism, helps those who (p. 38)
are worse off while avoiding leveling down. Sufficientarianism has been criticized, howev
er, for ignoring morally relevant differences above or below the selected thresholds
(Shields, 2012). Even if improving life expectancy for people in Bolivia and Guyana should
be the highest priority, the fact that Paraguayans live less long than Chileans is not obvi
ously irrelevant.

Correlative Principles
Correlative principles aim to correlate what people receive with some other dimension of
life in which they differ. Three of the most prominent correlative principles correlate what
people receive to (1) their contribution, (2) their effort, and (3) what they have tradition
ally received.

Contribution
Some theorists have argued that individuals who increase the amount available to be dis
tributed ought to receive more of what is distributed (Miller, 1990). As an example, indi
viduals who have previously donated organs might receive priority for organ transplants
in the future (Persad, Wertheimer, and Emanuel, 2009). Even though contribution-based
principles will often reach similar conclusions to the noncorrelative maximization princi
ple discussed earlier under the heading “Maximization,” contribution-based principles
look to past contributions, while maximization looks to future contributions.
Applied to the WHO chart, a contribution-based approach might favor public health ef
forts that improve life expectancy in Argentina, because the Argentinian economy con
tributes more to global productivity, over efforts to improve life expectancy in less-devel
oped Guyana. In light of the foundational importance of health to people’s lives, however,
contribution is arguably an inappropriate basis for distributing health, even if it can be an
appropriate basis for distributing other goods (Feiring, 2008).

Effort
Others argue that the distribution of goods should be based on individual effort, with
those who put in more effort receiving more. One prominent version of this view is ad
vanced by John Roemer (1993), who argues that we should ensure that people who exer
cise a “comparable degree of responsibility” do equally well, regardless of their back
ground circumstances. Roemer also proposes a detailed methodology for quantifying ef
fort, though this methodology has not been widely adopted in public health.
As with contribution, there is a worry that an effort-based distribution of health will be
unjustly harsh on those who exert little effort (Feiring, 2008). Explaining which kinds of
effort should count is also challenging. For instance, even if inefficient farming tech
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niques in Suriname mean that Surinamese farmers exert more effort to produce a given
quantity of food than Colombian farmers, rewarding effort that stems from inefficient
practices seems like a dubious basis for distributing benefits, including public (p. 39)
health benefits. Ultimately, as Susan Hurley (2002) observes, identifying which types of
effort matter for distribution seems to require some background account of justice. Once
this account has been identified, it is unclear why effort itself matters.

Tradition
A traditionalist view correlates what individuals receive with what they have historically
and traditionally received. Applied to Julie’s chart, a traditionalist view would attempt to
maintain the distribution of life expectancy over time, and so would oppose any proposal
that dramatically increases or decreases life expectancy.
Because of their opposition to change and tendency to maintain hierarchy, traditionalist
views are often identified with political conservatism and a bias toward the status quo
(Brennan and Hamlin, 2004). Such views have also been defended by thinkers such as Je
remy Bentham (1843) and David Hume (1739) on the basis of individuals’ psychological
attachment to accustomed arrangements. In practice, traditionalism frequently obstructs
public health innovations that might improve the lives of some but disrupt the lives of oth
ers. For instance, some assert that single-payer health insurance will be difficult to enact
in the United States because it would disrupt insurance arrangements to which many
have become accustomed (Feder, 2014).

Combining Principles
Any distributive principle can be paired with any metric (see Table 4.1). For instance,
while Rawls pairs a resourcist metric with a distributive approach that favors the worst
off, it is also possible—as he himself notes—to combine a resourcist metric with a distrib
utive approach that simply maximizes total resources without any special concern for the
worst off (Rawls, 1999, 277–285).
Some approaches to distributive justice employ only a single distributive principle, while
others include multiple principles, which are weighed against one another. (p. 40) Defend
ers of multi-principle approaches argue that no single principle adequately captures what
is needed for a just society (Persad, Wertheimer, and Emanuel, 2009). However, some
worry that multi-principle approaches fail to articulate a principled basis for balancing
different principles, such as equality and maximization, against one another (Rawls, 1999,
34–40).

Page 7 of 15

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: University of Denver; date: 18 February 2022

Justice and Public Health
Table 4.1 Metrics and Principles of Distributive Justice
Metrics

Distributive prin
ciples

Prominent approaches

(a) Re
sources

Noncorrelative

Rawlsian: (a) + (2)

(b) Capabili
ties

(1) Maximization

Utilitarian: (c) + (1)

(c) Welfare

(2) Prioritarianism

Faden and Powers: Modified
(b) + (4)

(3) Egalitarianism
(4) Sufficientarian
ism
Correlative
(1) Contribution
(2) Effort
(3) Tradition

What Else Matters? Individual Rights and Con
straints on Distributive Justice
Most accounts of justice recognize certain nondistributive constraints on the pursuit of
distributive principles. Rawls (1999), for instance, believes that certain basic liberties,
such as freedom of thought and association, political participation, freedom of movement,
and the right to hold personal property, must be secured before we begin thinking about
the just distribution of resources.
Many public health dilemmas involve conflicts between distributive goals and individuals’
basic rights or liberties. Many of these basic rights take the form of negative rights,
which are rights against intervention. For instance, rights to bodily integrity, freedom of
association, or freedom of religion might complicate efforts to require vaccinations
against a communicable disease or to quarantine individuals who show signs of infection,
even when these public health interventions would improve population health or achieve
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a better distribution of health. Some libertarian theories (e.g., Nozick, 1974) regard prop
erty rights as absolute and prohibit the imposition of taxes, which would have the effect
of choking off funding for public health interventions.
Meanwhile, basic positive rights, which are rights to receive benefits, can also obstruct
public health goals. For instance, recognizing an individual right to lifesaving health care
can consume resources that would otherwise be used to promote public health (Persad,
2014; Schmidt, Gostin, and Emanuel, 2015). Other types of rights, such as rights against
differential treatment on the basis of race or gender, can also come into conflict with pub
lic health initiatives such as targeted screening of poor women of color for human immun
odeficiency virus (HIV) infection (Faden and Powers, 2006, vii–viii), or restrictions on the
purchase of unhealthy foods (Kass et al., 2014; Barnhill, 2015).
Accounts of justice differ not only in the list of rights they recognize, but also in how they
handle conflicts between, on the one hand, distributive aims, such as sufficiency or priori
ty to the worst off, and, on the other hand, basic rights and liberties, such as freedom of
association or property rights. Some accounts, like Rawls’s, give fundamental liberties ab
solute priority over distributive aims. Others allow rights to be overridden when doing so
can dramatically improve distributive outcomes.

Where Does Justice Apply?: Global Justice
and the Scope of Justice
(p. 41)

Some accounts of justice give equal weight to all interests that are affected by a given de
cision. But many others give special weight to some interests. Deciding which interests
matter is the question of the scope of justice.
The most prominent debates have involved geographical scope, which separates theories
of justice that give special weight to one’s fellow citizens from those that do not. The lat
ter are often termed cosmopolitan and the former statist or nationalist (Emanuel, 2012).
This division can be moved further in or further out. For instance, some theories may give
special weight to fellow members of one’s state or city, or to larger collectivities than the
nation-state. Geographical scope has clear implications for public health choices; some in
terventions, such as vaccinations against communicable diseases, produce great benefits
outside a nation’s borders, while others have much more local effects.
Other distinctions of scope are also debated. There are, for instance, questions of tempo
ral scope (Rawls, 1999; Parfit, 1984): What weight should justice give to the interests of
those in the far future or distant past? There are even questions of biological scope (Don
aldson and Kymlicka, 2013): What weight should be given to the interests of nonhuman
animals or of ecosystems? These other forms of scope also bear on public health decisionmaking. For instance, how we evaluate changes in the design of the built environment
that affect carbon emissions will depend on what duties we owe to future generations.
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Likewise, evaluating the burdens that disease eradication may impose on nonhuman ani
mals who are carriers of disease will implicate questions of biological scope.

What Conduct Does Justice Evaluate?: The Site
of Justice
Discussions of the scope of justice try to identify the physical or conceptual spaces where
justice applies. In contrast, debates regarding the site of justice try to identify the actions
or interactions that are properly assessed by the standards of justice.
One prominent view on the site of justice, associated with Rawls (1999) and Thomas
Nagel (1991), regards distributive justice as applicable to the “basic structure” of society,
which comprises institutions such as constitutions or other fundamental legal rules that
organize society, as well as the economy, property, and general rules passed by legisla
tures. So, for example, justice would apply to decisions on whether to impose a tax on un
healthy foods, because these taxes are implemented through binding legislative (p. 42) ac
tion. In contrast, distributive justice does not apply to a shopkeeper’s decision to sell a
large sugary soda to an individual child, because that decision is not part of the basic
structure. While there may be good reasons to criticize the shopkeeper, such criticisms
are grounded in morality rather than justice, or at least in forms of justice other than dis
tributive justice.
A different perspective on the site of justice is adopted by G. A. Cohen (1997), who frames
it in terms of the feminist slogan “the personal is political.” In Cohen’s view, individual
choices, such as selling a sugary soda, must also be evaluated in terms of justice. For Co
hen, there is no clear distinction between rules of law, such as taxes or regulations, and
individual choices, such as the shopkeeper’s choice to sell soda to the child: all are sub
ject to the same form of evaluation.
Debates regarding the site of justice are relevant to the question of how broadly justice
applies to public health, and to the question of which actors within public health systems
should be concerned about justice. If Cohen’s view is correct, then Julie’s coworkers who
provide direct public health services, such as nurses or epidemiologists in the field,
should evaluate their choices in providing care or interviewing people by employing the
same principles of justice that apply to structural and legislative decisions. In contrast, if
justice applies only to the basic structure of society, then Julie and her colleagues still
have reason to care about justice, but providers of direct services can be subject only to
norms of professional ethics that are unrelated to, and may deviate from, principles of
distributive justice.
Last, many public health interventions, such as anti-smoking or safe-sex campaigns, at
tempt to shift social norms rather than creating or enforcing binding laws. This raises the
question of whether social norms should be evaluated according to principles of justice
(Ronzoni, 2008). Social norms are more than purely individual decisions, although norms
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can be reinforced or threatened by those decisions. However, they are not enforced by
the use of binding legal authority. Nonetheless, social norms can have a pervasive influ
ence on individuals’ lives.

Who Decides?: Resolving Disagreements about
Justice
This discussion has so far illustrated that questions about justice are complex. This com
plexity produces ample room for disagreement. One place for disagreement concerns
choices about how to understand justice, such as which constraints to recognize or which
metric to use. Another concerns the resolution of conflicts between different aspects of
justice, such as how to weigh constraints against distributive principles. As they try to de
cide which public health interventions should receive priority for funding and implemen
tation, Julie and her colleagues may face both these types of disagreements.
Disagreements about justice can be resolved in numerous ways. One way is
through democracy, where each position is presented to the public, who then determine
the best conception of justice. There are two major strands of democracy discussed by po
litical philosophers: aggregative and deliberative. In aggregative democracy, individuals
separately evaluate proposals and vote on them; their votes are then aggregated to deter
mine which proposal is selected. In contrast, in deliberative democracy, individuals gath
er together to discuss and debate the proposals under consideration, with their discus
sions constrained by certain procedural and substantive norms (Cohen, 2009; Gutmann
and Thompson, 2004). After the discussions, individuals either vote independently or
reach some sort of communal consensus.
(p. 43)

Democracy has the advantage of giving each individual’s perspective equal weight, and of
ensuring that political decisions are responsive to the public. It faces some challenges,
however, in handling certain questions of justice. For instance, determining whose voice
counts in democratic decisions requires settling the question of the scope of justice
(Goodin, 2007), which makes it difficult to derive an account of the scope of justice from
democracy alone. Additionally, if voters are confused or uninterested, they may reach out
comes that are substantively bad, and pure democracy may also reach outcomes that are
bad for those in the minority (Arneson, 2009). Finally, real-world decision-making
processes, even formally democratic ones, frequently give insufficient weight to the voic
es of poor or socially excluded groups (Young, 2000).
In public health, democracy frequently plays a role in determining whether a given inter
vention is implemented or a given consideration is accepted as relevant to justice. For in
stance, votes about whether to tax sugary drinks or unhealthy foods frequently reflect
judgments about the justice of taxation. Similarly, votes on gun control in various states
and municipalities raise judgments about the justice of regulation. Norman Daniels and
James Sabin (2002) suggest that an approach they call “accountability for reasonable
ness,” which has affinities with deliberative democracy, can be used to set priorities in a
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variety of health settings, including negotiations between governments and providers of
health care services.
Although the most popular way of resolving disagreements rests on some version of
democracy, alternatives exist. One prominent alternative to democracy is to appeal to
some foundational moral ideal. For instance, Nussbaum (2003) bases her list of capabili
ties not on democratic, collective judgments, but on an Aristotelian account of what it
means for a human being to flourish. Similarly, some utilitarians regard the importance of
maximizing overall welfare as a foundational truth to which we can reason by simply re
flecting on the nature of human rationality (de Lazari-Radek and Singer, 2014).

Conclusion
Just as medicine’s emphasis on individual-level dilemmas connects it with individual
morality and ethics, public health’s population-level emphasis inevitably connects it
(p. 44) with political philosophy and justice. Understanding the landscape of justice will
enable actors within public health systems both to evaluate the merits of different public
health choices and to compare public health interventions with interventions outside of
public health.
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